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Abstract: The “ZIP” adaptive trading algorithm has been demonstrated to out-
perform human traders in experimental studies of continuous double auction 
(CDA) markets. The original ZIP algorithm requires the values of eight control 
parameters to be set correctly. A new extension of the ZIP algorithm, called 
ZIP60, requires the values of 60 parameters to be set correctly. ZIP60 is shown 
here to produce significantly better results than the original ZIP (called “ZIP8” 
hereafter), for negligable additional computational costs. A genetic algorithm 
(GA) is used to search the 60-dimensional ZIP60 parameter space, and it finds 
parameter vectors that yield ZIP60 traders with mean scores significantly better 
than those of ZIP8s. This paper shows that the optimizing evolutionary search 
works best when the GA itself controls the dimensionality of the search-space, 
so that the search commences in an 8-d space and thereafter the dimensionality 
of the search-space is gradually increased by the GA until it is exploring a 60-d 
space. Furthermore, the results from ZIP60 cast some doubt on prior ZIP8 re-
sults concerning the evolution of new ‘hybrid’ auction mechanisms that ap-
peared to be better than the CDA. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The Zero-Intelligence Plus (ZIP) adaptive automated trading algorithm [6] has been 
demonstrated to outperform human traders in experimental studies of continuous 
double auction (CDA) markets populated by mixtures of human and “robot” traders 
[15]. To successfully populate a market with ZIP traders, the values of eight real-val-
ued control parameters need to be set correctly. While these eight values can of course 
be set manually, previous papers have demonstrated that this 8-d parameter-value 
vector can be automatically optimized using a simple genetic algorithm (GA) search 
to tailor ZIP traders to particular markets, thereby producing results superior to those 
from ZIP traders with manually-set parameter values [7, 8]. Furthermore, a simple 
extension of the GA-ZIP approach (i.e., adding a single additional real-valued nu-
meric parameter, its value set by the GA) allows for automated market-mechanism 
design, and has been demonstrated as a possible way of automatically discovering 
novel “hybrid” forms of auction mechanism that appear to be more efficient than the 
CDA [10, 11, 12]. This paper introduces a more sophisticated version of the ZIP algo-
rithm, which is shown to produce significantly better results. The extended variant is 
known as “ZIP60”, because it requires 60 real-valued control parameters to be set  
correctly, and thus the original algorithm is now re-named as “ZIP8”. Manually iden-
tifying the correct values for 60 control parameters could be a very laborious task, but 
it is demonstrated here that an appropriate automatic search or optimization process 
(such as a GA) can reliably discover good sets of values for the parameters, so long as 
some care is exercised in controlling a gradual expansion of the dimensionality of the 
search-space. The GA operating in the 60-dimensional parameter space is shown to 
produce markets populated by ZIP60 traders with mean scores significantly better 
than those of ZIP8s. Moreover, the ZIP60 results presented in this paper, while better 
than ZIP8, show a markedly reduced incidence of cases where the GA also discovers 
novel hybrid auction mechanisms within which the ZIP traders perform significantly 
better than when they interact within the fixed CDA mechanism. A plausible conclu-
sion drawn from this is that it indicates that the earlier ZIP8 results (where apparent 
“improvements” on the CDA were common) were actually consequences of the rela-
tive lack of sophistication in the ZIP8 algorithm, rather than consequences of previ-
ously-undiscovered weaknesses in the CDA mechanism that the ZIP8 traders were 
operating within. 
In the interests of scientific openness and ease of replicability, the C source-code that 
was used to generate the ZIP60 results in this paper has been published in a technical 
report freely available on the web [13]. 
This paper reports on an ongoing line of research, and there are several open avenues 
of research that could be pursued to extend or further explore the ideas presented here. 
In particular, it is important to note that the results in this paper are certainly not in-
tended as an absolute and conclusive demonstration that ZIP60 is superior to all other 
CDA bidding algorithms, or that the solutions discovered by the GA are optimal in 
the sense of the GA routinely discovering Nash equilibria in the experimental markets 
that ZIP60 is studied within here. This paper studies the equilibrating performance of 
markets that are homogeneously populated with one type of trader-agent, in the style 
of frequently-cited prior work such as that by Gode & Sunder [20], Cliff [6, 9, 12], 
Preist & van Tol [30], and Gjerstad & Dickhaut [19]; rather than studying strategic 
interactions within markets heterogeneously populated by two or more different types 
of trading algorithms or market mechanisms, such as is exemplified by [38, 39, & 29]. 
Although the original paper [6] that introduced the ZIP8 algorithm also studied 
ZIP8’s performance only in homogeneously populated markets, nevertheless ZIP8 
was subsequently used as a benchmark trading algorithm in numerous studies of stra-
tegic interactions between heterogeneous mixes of trading algorithms, performed by 
several independent groups of researchers. The number of such papers in which ZIP8 
(or close derivatives of ZIP8) have been used is fairly large, and the list includes: [15, 
38, 39, 23, 29, 40, & 1]. Thus, given that so much prior work exploring strategic in-
teractions and heterogeneous populations has been based on ZIP8, it seems reasonable 
at least to presume that researchers with an interest in studying heterogeneous mar-
ketplaces might find ZIP60 a useful new benchmark, even though this current paper 
reports only on ZIP60 in homogeneous settings. While the study of ZIP60’s strategic 
interactions with other CDA bidding algorithms is certainly an important topic of 
further research, it is beyond the scope of this current paper. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in pretty much all of the above-cited papers 
studying strategic interactions between heterogeneous mixtures of bidding algorithms, 
the results come from experiments in which the nature of the market supply and de- 
mand curves are essentially fixed for the duration of each experiment. That is, studies 
exploring the effects that significant changes to the supply or demand (or both) curves 
can have on the trading-agent market’s internal dynamics seem pretty rare. Most of-
ten, the supply and demand curves in any one trader-agent experiment remain largely 
the same for the entire duration of that experiment. This seems very curious, given 
that one commonly-claimed motivation for studying market systems is that mecha-
nisms such as the CDA are interesting because of their ability to quickly and robustly 
adapt to dynamic and unexpected changes in supply and/or demand; that studies of 
shock-changes in human CDA markets date back as far as Vernon Smith’s seminal 
1962 paper [36]; and that such changes are known to occur in real-world markets.
2 If 
CDA markets are interesting because they exhibit attractive adaptation to dynamic 
changes in supply and demand, why is there this affection in the trading-agent litera-
ture for studying CDA systems where such changes are largely absent? In contrast, 
the results reported in this paper all come from experiments in which the marketplaces 
periodically undergo sudden “shock” changes to the supply and/or demand curves, 
and where the ZIP60 traders are optimized on the basis of their ability to rapidly and 
stably adapt to the new market conditions prevailing after each shock-change.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of ZIP 
traders and of the experimental methods used, including a description of the continu-
ously variable space of auction types. This description is largely identical to the ac-
count given in previous papers (e.g., [10, 12]), albeit extended to describe how the 
new experiments whose results are presented here differ from the previous work. The 
new ZIP60 results are then presented, analyzed, and discussed in Section 3. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 The original eight-parameter ZIP 
The original eight-parameter ZIP trading algorithm was first described fully in a 
lengthy report [6], which included source-code (in ANSI C) of an example imple-
mentation. For the purposes of this paper, a high-level description of the algorithm 
and its eight key parameters is sufficient. Illustrative C source-code for ZIP60 has 
been published in [13]. As will be seen in Section 3, there are in fact a family of ZIP 
algorithms between ZIP8 and ZIP60, and so hereinafter the acronym “ZIP” with no 
numeric suffix is intended to mean “all ZIPn for 8≤n≤60 and beyond”. 
ZIP traders deal in arbitrary abstract commodities. Each ZIP trader i is given a private 
(i.e., secret) limit-price, λi, which for a seller is the price below which it must not sell 
and for a buyer is the price above which it must not buy. If a ZIP trader completes a 
transaction at its λi price then it generates zero utility (“profit” for the sellers or “sav-
ing” for the buyers). For this reason, each ZIP trader i maintains a time-varying utility 
margin μi(t) and generates quote-prices pi(t) at time t using pi(t)=λi(1+μi(t)) for sellers 
and pi(t)=λi(1-μi(t)) for buyers. The “aim” of traders is to maximize their utility over 
all trades, where utility is the difference between the accepted quote-price and the 
trader’s λi value. Trader i is given an initial value μi(0) (i.e., μi(t) for t=0) which is 
subsequently adapted over time using a simple machine learning technique known as 
the Widrow-Hoff rule which is also used in back-propagation neural networks and in 
learning classifier systems. This rule has a “learning rate” parameter βi that governs 
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the speed of convergence between trader i’s quoted price pi(t) and the trader’s ideal-
ized “target” price τi(t). When calculating τi(t), ZIP traders introduce a small random 
absolute perturbation generated from
3 U[0,ca] (this perturbation is positive when in-
creasing τi(t), negative when decreasing) and also a small random relative perturba-
tion generated from U[1-cr,1] when decreasing τi(t), or from U[1,1+cr] when in-
creasing τi(t), where ca and cr are global system constants. To smooth over noise in 
the learning system, there is an additional “momentum” parameter γi for each trader 
(such momentum terms are also common in back-propagation neural networks).  
So, adaptation in each ZIP trader i has the following parameters: initial margin μi(0); 
learning rate βi; and momentum term γi.  In an entire market populated by ZIP traders, 
values for these three parameters are randomly assigned to each trader via 
μi(0)=fa(μmin, μΔ),  βi=fa(βmin, βΔ), and γi=fa(γmin, γΔ); for fa(α, κ)=U[α, α+κ]. Hence, 
to initialize an entire ZIP-trader market, it is necessary to specify values for the six 
market-initialization parameters μmin, μΔ, βmin, βΔ, γmin, and γΔ; and for the two system 
constants ca and cr. Thus any set of initialization parameters for a ZIP-trader market 
exists within an eight-dimensional real space – hence “ZIP8”.  
Vectors in this 8-space can be considered as “genotypes” in a genetic algorithm (GA), 
and from an initial population of randomly generated genotypes it is possible to allow 
a GA to find new genotype vectors that best satisfy an appropriate evaluation func-
tion. This is exactly the process that was first introduced in [7, 8]. For the purposes of 
this paper, we will consider the GA optimizer as a “black box” and leave it largely un-
discussed: full details accompany the source-code in [13].  
In addition to using the GA to optimize the control parameters for the trader-agents, 
one more real-valued numeric parameter was introduced in [10–12] to give the GA 
automated control over the auction mechanism. This market-mechanism parameter is 
called Qs and it governs the exogenously imposed probability that the next quote in the 
marketplace will be taken from a seller, so Qs=0.0 is a pure one-sided auction where 
only buyers can quote (and hence is similar to an English auction); Qs=1.0 is pure 
one-sided with only sellers quoting (as in a Dutch Flower auction); and Qs=0.5 makes 
quotes from buyers or sellers equi-probable (as in a CDA).  The surprising result re-
ported in [10–12] is that “hybrid” auction mechanisms (such as Qs=0.25) were found 
by the GA to give the best evaluation scores when the value of Qs was evolved along-
side the values of the eight ZIP control parameters. Experiments where the value of 
Qs was under control of the GA are referred to here as “EM“ (for “evolving mecha-
nism”) experiments, and experiments where the value of Qs was fixed, typically at the 
CDA value of 0.5, are referred to as “FM” experiments (for “fixed mechanism”). 
The fitness of genotypes was evaluated here using the methods described previously 
[7, 8, 10–12]: one trial of a particular genome was performed by initializing a ZIP-
trader market from the genome, and then allowing the ZIP traders to operate within 
the market for a fixed number of trading periods (often colloquially referred to as 
“days”), with allocations of stock and currency being replenished between each trad-
ing period. During each trading period, Smith’s [36] α measure (root mean square 
deviation of transaction prices from the market’s theoretical competitive equilibrium 
price) was monitored, and a weighted average of α was calculated across the days in 
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the trial, using a method described in more detail in the next section. As the outcome 
of any one such trial is influenced by stochasticity in the system, the final evaluation 
score for an individual was calculated as the arithmetic mean of 100 such trials. Note 
that as minimal deviation of transaction prices from the theoretical equilibrium price 
is desirable, lower scores are better: we aim here to minimize the evaluation scores. 
That is, individuals with lower scores have greater reproductive fitness. 
  
2.2. Previous ZIP8 Results 
In [12], results from 32 sets of experiments were published, where each experiment 
involved sequences built from one or more of four specific market supply and demand 
schedules. These four schedules are referred to as markets M1, M2, M3, and M4, and 
are illustrated in [12, 13]. In all four schedules there are 11 buyers and 11 sellers, each 
empowered to buy/sell one unit of commodity. Market M1 is taken from Smith’s 
seminal 1962 paper [36] on his early experimental economics work, and the remain-
ing three markets are variations on M1. In M2 the slope of the demand curve has been 
greatly reduced while the slope of the supply curve has been increased only slightly; 
and in M4 the slope of the supply curve has been greatly reduced while the slope of 
the demand curve has been increased only slightly. In M3 the slopes of both the 
supply and demand curves are only slightly steeper than the slopes in M1, yet these 
minor differences between the supply and demand curves in M1 and M3 can still lead 
to significant differences in the final best evolved solutions.  
The experiments reported in this paper use a method first explored in ZIP8 experi-
ments, involving “shock changes” being inflicted on the market by swapping from 
one schedule to another partway through the evaluation process. Here, two shocks 
occurred during each evaluation process (i.e., switching between three schedules). For 
instance, in one experiment referred to here as M121, the evaluation involved six 
trading periods (“days”) with supply and demand determined by M1, then a sudden 
change to M2, then six periods/days later a reversion to M1 for a final six periods. 
The other sets of experiments are similarly named M212, M123, M321, and so on. 
Each of the three market schedules was used for six “days”, so the two-shock trials 
last for 18 days. As in the previous GA-ZIP work, the evaluation function was a 
weighted average of Smith’s  [36] “α” measure of root mean square deviation of 
transaction prices from the underlying theoretical equilibrium price at the start of the 
experiment, measured across the six periods for each schedule used: in each trading 
period  p the value αp was calculated, and the evaluation score was computed as 
(1/Σwp).Σ(αp.wp) for p=1…18 with weights w1=1.75, w2=1.5, w3=1.25, w3<p<7=1.0, 
wp>6=wp-6, and  wp>12=wp-12. 
The process used to compare the EM and FM cases is as follows. In any one experi-
ment, here involving a population of 30 genotypes over 500 generations, in each gen-
eration the elite (best-scoring) individual is of most interest, and so the time-series of 
the elite fitness score for the population is monitored across the 500 generations. 
These results are non-deterministic: different runs of the GA (with different seed val-
ues for its random number generator) will yield different elite trajectories. Examining 
the results from 50 repetitions of an experiment (varying only the random seed be-
tween repetitions) often gives multimodal results, and in all experiments we are inter-
ested only in the best elite mode (i.e. the mode with lowest scores), which can be 
summarized by the mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of the scores within that mode  
at each generation: these two values will be referred to here as the best elite-mode 
fitness mean and s.d.. For comparison purposes, in the ZIP8 work reported in [12], 
similar trajectories of best elite-mode fitness values were recorded from 50 repetitions 
of the each experiment in fixed-mechanism (FM) conditions, where the value of Qs 
was not evolved but instead was fixed at the CDA value of Qs=0.5.  
The results from 18 dual-shock (triple-schedule) experiments were presented in four 
separate data-tables in [12], grouped by the nature of the shocks (i.e., the “treatment 
regime”). Table 3 showed results from experiments where only the demand curve 
undergoes a major change on each shock (i.e.: M121, M212, M232, M323, M123, 
and M321). Table 4 showed results from experiments where only the supply curve 
undergoes a major change on each shock (i.e.: M141, M414, M434, M343, M143, 
and M341). In Table 5, one of the two shocks involves a major change only to the 
demand curve while the other shock involves a major change only to the supply curve 
(i.e.: M432, M234, M412, and M214); and in Table 6 each shock involved a major 
change to both the supply curve and the demand curve (i.e.: M242 and M424). In this 
paper, all 18 dual-shock results are shown together in a single graph, but the results 
appear in table order, as was just listed.  
Analysis of the ZIP8 results showed that the GA never failed to discover EM geno-
types that were at least as good (i.e. had elite evaluation scores at least as low) as the 
corresponding FM genotypes, and in several cases the EM result was significantly 
better (lower) than the FM result, at the 1% confidence level, using appropriate non-
parametric significance tests such as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (see, e.g., [35]), or 
latterly the Robust Rank Order test [16].  
The histogram in Figure 1 shows the results for GA-optimized ZIP8 in FM and EM 
conditions. Fig.1 also shows the results from various styles of ZIP60 EM experiments, 
discussed further in Section 3 of this paper. The ZIP8 statistics in Fig.1 are the results 
of conducting a more rigorous and careful analysis (discussed in [13]) of the data than 
was originally summarized and tabulated in [12]. The final evaluation score recorded 
as the outcome of any one experiment is now taken as an average of the final few elite 
scores (over generations 490 to 500) to smooth over noise in the evaluation process; 
and the summary statistics for each type of experiment are here always calculated 
from the top 10% (i.e., the upper decile) of the 50 repetitions of each type of experi-
ment, regardless of how many repetitions converged on solutions with final elite 
scores in the best elite mode. So, the data in Fig.1 show the mean and s.d. of the final 
outcome elite scores from the best (lowest-scoring) five experiments in each study.  
 
2.3 Related Work  
These previous GA-ZIP results have subsequently been replicated, adapted, and ex-
tended in a number of independent studies. Robinson [32] explored the use of evolved 
market-mechanisms in the context of market-based control (e.g. [4]) of scarce re-
sources in utility-scale corporate data centers. Walia [41] explored the use of the same 
evolving-mechanism techniques but with markets populated by Gode & Sunder’s [20] 
ZI trader-agents rather than ZIP traders, again finding evidence that non-standard hy-
brid mechanisms were discovered as good/best solutions by the GA; and Byde [2] 
demonstrated that the same techniques could lead to the evolution of hybrid sealed-
bid auction mechanisms, regardless of the type of trader operating in the market. 
Shipp [34] investigated how the nature of the evolved solutions changed as the num- 
ber of “market shocks” used in the evaluation process increased; and Wichett [43] 
explored a system in which multiple reproductively separate “gene-pools” of ZIP 
traders competed, co-adapted, and co-evolved along with the market mechanism. 
Other recent uses of ZIP include modifying it for bargaining in sealed-bid auctions 
[1]; using ZIP traders to study speculative trading in business-to-business exchanges 
[25]; and using ZIP traders to explore issues of reputation and information quality in a 
variety of market configurations [24]. 
The results in [10] were the first demonstration that radically new market mechanisms 
for artificial traders may be designed by automatic means. But, at much the same time 
as they were being generated, Steve Phelps and his colleagues were independently 
working on a conceptually very similar (but algorithmically rather different) theme of 
using artificial evolution to develop and study new auction-market mechanisms [29]. 
In addition to the contemporaneous work of Phelps et al., a number of other authors 
have more recently reported on the results of using artificial evolution and other forms 
of automated search, learning, or optimization for exploring spaces of possible trader-
agent strategies, and possible new auction mechanisms, generally with positive results 
[39, 18, 26, 28, 21, 27, 31, & 42]. Of course, the paper introducing ZIP [6] was not 
the first-ever study of artificial trading agents in double-auction markets; notable prior 
work includes [44], [17], and [33]. Also, [19] was developed independently at much 
the same time. For additional discussion of earlier work, see [6]. 
 
3. ZIP60 
3.1 From 8 to 60 in five paragraphs  
The results from using a GA to fine-tune the ZIP8 trader were sufficiently encourag-
ing that they provoke the question of whether new variants of ZIP can be developed to 
take advantage of the fact that we can now (generally, at least) rely on automated 
optimizers like the GA to set appropriate values for the numeric parameters affecting 
the traders. If we commit to using an optimizer to set the parameter values, we don’t 
need to keep the number of parameters small enough for them all to be manageable or 
comprehensible by humans. That’s the rationale for ZIP60.  
To this end, observe that in ZIP8 the genome specifies the same vector of eight real 
values {μmin , μΔ , βmin , βΔ , γmin , γΔ , ca , cr} whether the trader is a buyer or a seller. 
But in some situations it’s plausible that the market dynamics might be better if the 
parameter-values used by the buyers were different to those used by the sellers, so we 
could in principle have a GA-ZIP system dealing with these two cases (i.e. where 
Case 1 is that the trader is a buyer; Case 2 is that the trader is a seller) and hence op-
timizing sixteen real parameters (i.e., “ZIP16”), with the first vector of eight values 
being used to initialize the buyers and the second being used to initialize the sellers. 
Next, note that in some situations a ZIP trader (whether it is a buyer or a seller) has to 
increase its margin, and in others it has to decrease its margin, and that it may be use-
ful to have different parameter-values depending on which of the four cases we are in, 
i.e. whether the trader is a buyer raising its margin, a buyer lowering its margin, a 
seller raising, or a seller lowering. That’s 4 cases, each with 8 values, and so “ZIP32”. 
But we can then additionally note that, in the original specification of the ZIP algo-
rithm, both for buyers and for sellers, there are actually three different cases or 
circumstances in which the trader alters its margin (see [6] pp.42-43 for the details of 
and rationale for this design). For example, a seller’s margin is raised if one condition  
holds true (i.e., if the last quote was accepted and the seller’s current price is less than 
the price of the current quote); but a seller’s margin is lowered if either of two other 
possible conditions are true (i.e.: if the last quote was an accepted bid and the seller is 
active and the seller’s price is greater than the price of the last quote; or if the last 
quote was an offer that was accepted and the seller is active and its price is greater 
than the price of the last quote). So we could have the genome specify three corre-
sponding parameter-value vectors for the buyers and also three such vectors for the 
sellers, i.e. a total of six different vectors for six different cases, which at eight values 
per vector gives us “ZIP48”. 
And in a final flourish of parameter-count inflation, let’s abandon the use of a mere 
pair of system-wide global constants ca and cr and in place initialize each trader i with 
its own corresponding “personal” values ca,i and cr,i, generated at initialization from 
the uniform distributions U[ca:min, ca:min+ca:Δ] & U[cr:min, cr:min+cr:Δ]. This addition of 
extra parameters still allows solutions involving the old system-wide constant ca and 
cr values to be “discovered” by the GA − that will happen if better evaluation scores 
are associated with (near-)zero values of ca:Δ and cr:Δ. So, the parameter-value vectors 
for each case needs now to specify not only the six previous system parameters (μmin , 
μΔ , βmin , βΔ , γmin , and γΔ) but also the values for the four newly-introduced system 
parameters ca:min, ca:Δ, cr:min, and cr:Δ  −   i.e., ten values per vector. For six cases, each 
with ten values per vector, we get to sixty values: “ZIP60”. 
It is worth noting that this final increase from eight to ten parameter-values per case 
could also be applied to any of the other ZIPn versions mentioned in the preceding 
paragraphs. That is, by the expansion of the specification of ca and cr, ZIP8 becomes 
ZIP10; ZIP16 becomes ZIP20; and ZIP32 becomes ZIP40.  
We need also to introduce some terminology that will ease the analysis and discussion 
that come later. While a ZIP8 trader has one genetically-specified value for each pa-
rameter (so, for example, it has only one βmin value), a ZIP60 genome specifies six 
related parameter values – one for each case – which we will refer to by adding case-
numbers to the subscript (e.g.: βmin:1, βmin:2, ..., βmin:6). For ZIP60, the entire set of 
sixty parameters can be generated from the pattern Pt:n where P is one of {μ , β , γ, ca , 
cr}; t is one of {min, Δ}; and n is an integer in {1,…,6}. We’ll refer to the set of six 
values for any one parameter-type (i.e., {Pt:1, Pt:2, …, Pt:6} for some given P and t) as 
the homologous set of Pt parameter values.  
Finally, note that the additional computational costs of using ZIP60 as a replacement 
for ZIP8 are virtually zero. The space costs are those incurred in storing the additional 
52 real-valued parameters: this is a large percentage increase, but in absolute terms it 
is still a very small amount of storage when expressed as actual additional bytes re-
quired. The additional time costs are also very low indeed: a tiny amount of extra 
processing is needed in initialising the ZIP60 trader (i.e., populating its look-up table 
of 60 real values) and then in doing table look-up while the trader is operating (i.e. 
choosing the values to use that are appropriate to the current “case”), but that’s it.  
 
3.2 ZIP60 Results: Control of Search-Space Dimensionality Required 
In testing the performance of ZIP60, all effort thus far has been devoted to exploring 
the performance of ZIP60 on dual-shock tests: if markets populated by ZIP traders 
cannot cope with sudden shock-changes in supply and demand, then they are of little  
interest. Moreover, it seems highly likely (but has not yet actually been empirically 
verified) that if ZIP60 does better than ZIP8 on these multi-shock tests, then it will 
also do better in those cases where there are fewer or no market shocks.  
Experience with GA optimisation of ZIP60 indicates that significant care is needed in 
managing the dimensionality of the search-space: simply applying the old methods 
that worked well with ZIP8 does not give best results when working with ZIP60. This 
is a lesson learnt from experience: for the very first attempts at evolutionary optimi-
zation of ZIP60 traders, the same experiment methods as described in Section 2 were 
used, except that the initial population was composed entirely of randomly generated 
ZIP60 individuals, rather than ZIP8s. The results from these attempts were somewhat 
mixed. Although the scores of the elite evolved ZIP60 traders were on average sig-
nificantly better than the elite ZIP8 scores in the same experiments, the standard de-
viation on that average improvement was almost identical to the mean improvement 
itself. This large standard deviation was a reflection of the fact that, in a few cases, the 
evolved elite ZIP60 results were actually significantly worse than the corresponding 
ZIP8 results. Now there is nothing preventing the ZIP60 GA system from evolving 
genotypes that correspond to ZIP8 solutions, so it seems peculiar that the ZIP60s per-
form worse than the ZIP8s in some cases. There are certainly points within the ZIP60 
genome-space that correspond perfectly to ZIP8 solutions: if for each of the ten ho-
mologous sets the within-set variance of the parameter values for the set is (near) 
zero, then that ZIP60 genome is functionally equivalent to the corresponding single-
case ZIP10 genome; and furthermore if the values of the ca:Δ and cr:Δ homologous sets 
are all zero, then the ZIP60 is functioning as a ZIP8. So, how come the ZIP60 results 
are sometimes worse than ZIP8? The fact that the GA failed to find ZIP8 solutions 
within the ZIP60 genome space is a strong indication that the 60-dimensional search 
space has characteristics (such as local maxima, sharp ridges, and plateaus in the fit-
ness landscape) which make the search for good genomes a nontrivial process. 
To address this, the ZIP genetic encoding was extended, allowing the number of cases 
(1, 2, 4, or 6, as discussed in Section 3.1) to be specified on the genome itself. The rest 
of the genome is still a set of ten homologous-set vectors (each made of six real num-
bers). If an individual’s gene specifying the number of cases is set to one, then all six 
parameter-values are set to be identical within each homologous set, by copying the 
values from the first element of the set into the remaining five. If the number of cases 
is set to two, then the three buyer-case parameter values within each set are forced to 
be identical copies of each other, as are the three seller values; and if the number of 
cases is set to be six, then the three buyer and the three seller parameters can all be 
different numeric values. Thus, the ZIP60 genomes are always 60 parameter-values 
long, but over-writing duplication of values within the genome can reduce the effec-
tive dimensionality of the parameter-vectors encoded on a particular genome so that it 
codes for any of the family of ZIP algorithms between ZIP60 and ZIP8.  
The motivating hypothesis for placing the dimensionality of the search-space under 
evolutionary control was the belief that the GA’s evolutionary search would be more 
successful if it could start by first simply optimizing the 1-case genome, and then 
(only once all the values are approximately correct) could successive multi-case re-
finements be progressively introduced by the GA as necessary. So, for example, if a 
1-case individual mutated to become a high-case individual, thereby decoupling its 
genome-values across the different cases, such a mutant would only be retained in the  
population if the mutation that increases the number of cases is also associated with 
higher fitness. Strictly speaking, the initial case-increasing mutation is selectively 
neutral: the genome values for the different cases start out as identical copies of each 
other, but the case-increasing mutation allows subsequent mutations to introduce dif-
ferences across cases, and it is those mutations that will be retained if they are corre-
lated with higher fitness.  Handing evolutionary control of the dimensionality of a 
search-space to the GA that is searching that space is an idea that was first explored in 
depth in Harvey’s [22] thesis, where he developed the “species adaptation genetic 
algorithm”, which was first successfully applied in evolving neural-network control-
lers for autonomous mobile physical robots [5].
4
Two new sets of ZIP60 experiments were performed to test the effects of GA-con-
trolled dimensionality. In the first set, the population was initialised with individuals 
that had a randomly-assigned value for the number of cases on their genome, with the 
values 1, 2, 4, and 6 being equally probable. This is the initialization we refer to here 
as ZIP60(1:6) (for “from 1 case to 6 cases”). In the second set, every individual in the 
initial population was set to have a 1-case genome; this is referred to here as the 
ZIP60(1:1) initialization.  And so the first set of experiments, where all individuals in 
the initial populations were 6-case individuals, are referred to as ZIP60(6:6). Results 
from the EM experiments with ZIP60 with the (1:1), (1:6), and (6:6) initializations are 
shown in Figure 1, with ZIP8 EM and FM scores shown alongside, for comparison. 
The histogram in Figure 1 shows the mean elite ZIP60 EM scores alongside the ZIP8 
EM and FM scores: ZIP60 consistently out-performs ZIP8, and the error bars showing 
the s.d. values make it clear that these differences are significant. On the average, the 
ZIP60(1:1) scores are 14.0% better (lower) than the ZIP8 scores (and the s.d. on that 
mean improvement is 5.7%). In comparison, the ZIP60(6:6) scores are on average 
12.91% better than the ZIP8, but the s.d. on that improvement is 12.88%; and for 
ZIP60(1:6), the average improvement is 12.32% with s.d.=7.03%. So, ZIP60(1:1) has 
the highest mean increase in performance and the lowest s.d. on its mean increase.  
Results from significance analysis of the differences between the ZIP60(1:1) and 
ZIP60(1:6) upper-decile elite scores for the 18 dual-shock experiment schedules are 
tabulated in [13], and they offer weakly supportive evidence for the claim that 
ZIP60(1:1) is a better initialization than ZIP60(1:6). Using the Robust Rank Order test 
[16] at the 1% significance level reveals that, over the 18 types of experiment, only 
for schedule M242 does ZIP60(1:1) lead to significantly better results than 
ZIP60(1:6). In all other cases, no statistically significant difference in the scores is 
detected. So, ZIP60(1:1) is certainly no worse than ZIP60(1:6), and the evidence thus 
far is that it is actually significantly better in one of the 18 cases studied. The absence 
of a huge difference is perhaps no surprise given that a ZIP60(1:1) system will, after 
sufficiently many generations, be pretty much indistinguishable from a ZIP60(1:6) as 
mutants with case-values greater than unity are progressively retained in the (1:1)-
seeded population. 
Examination of the elite genomes across the course of the 500 generations, discussed 
and illustrated in [13], shows that although the ZIP60(1:1) population starts out 
composed entirely of 1-case genomes, after a while the number of 2-case, 4-case, and 
                                                           
4 A recent paper by Stanley & Miikkulainen [37] re-discovers some of Harvey’s [22] ideas of evolutionar-
ily controlled dimensionality increase, which Stanley & Miikkulainen rename as “complexification”.  
6-case mutant genomes starts to increase, and by the end of each experiment the elite 
individual is almost always a 6-case genome. ZIP60(1:6)-seeded experiments also 
virtually always end with 6-case elite genomes. 
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Figure 1: Mean elite outcome scores from the best 10% (n=5) of the 50 repetitions of each of 
the 18 “dual-shock” experiments involving two sudden changes in market supply and demand 
function, as described in the text. Labels on the horizontal axis indicate the specific shock se-
quence. Vertical axis is evaluation score: a weighted average of root mean square deviation of 
transaction prices from the theoretical competitive equilibrium price, expressed as a percent-
age of the equilibrium price; a metric labeled “α” by Smith [36]. Lower scores are better. 
Each bar in the graph shows a mean score, with error bars at plus and minus one s.d. For each 
shock-sequence, the cluster of 5 bars shows the results for (from left to right): EM ZIP60(1:1); 
EM ZIP60(1:6); EM ZIP60(6:6); FM ZIP8, & EM ZIP8. See text for further discussion. 
  
3.3 Principal Component Analysis 
The results just presented demonstrate that ZIP60(1:1) most consistently out-performs 
ZIP8, which strongly suggests that the larger number of additional parameters are 
indeed useful. However, as was noted above, it is possible for a ZIP60 genome to be 
functionally equivalent to a lower-dimensioned ZIPn genome. In the most extreme 
case, if all the values in each homologous set of parameters are equal for any one ge-
nome (so, e.g., βΔ 1=βΔ 2=βΔ 3=βΔ 4=βΔ 5=βΔ 6), or if the differences between them are 
all sufficiently small to be ignored as mutational noise, then that ZIP60 genome is 
functionally equivalent to a ZIP10 genome. And if it has zero values for its caΔ and 
crΔ  parameters, then it is effectively a ZIP8.  
So, to confirm that ZIP60 is indeed an advance on ZIP8 (or ZIP10), some analysis of 
the final evolved parameter-sets is necessary, to see whether they contain any low-
dimensional solutions embedded in higher-dimensional spaces. To this end, principal 
component analysis (PCA) was used on the parameter-values from the top-decile 
ZIP60 genomes. PCA is explained in most textbooks on multivariate analysis, e.g. [3]. 
Each six-dimensional homologous set of final evolved parameter values from all 18 
sets of experiments was individually subjected to PCA, and the percentage of the 
variance in the parameter values accounted for by each principal component (PC) was 
calculated. If all the values in any one homologous set were equal or approximately 
equal, the first PC would account for very nearly 100% of the variance. However, the 
first PC would also account for close to 100% of the variance if the values in the ho-
mologous set were positioned along/around any line in the 6-D space, e.g. one where 
Pt:i≠Pt:j  (for some P in {μ , β , γ, ca , cr}; some t in {min, Δ}; and for i, j integers in 
{1,…,6} with i≠j). So, to identify a ZIP8/ZIP10 embedded in a ZIP60 genome, we’d 
need to see the first PC for each homologous set accounting for close to 100% of the 
variance, and see the angle θ  between the first PC and the line Pt:1=Pt:2=…=Pt:6 be-
ing very close to zero. That is for θ = π  – | cos
-1 ( (p1 . u ) / | p1 | ) –π | with p1 being 
the first PC (a 6-D vector) and u being a 6-D unit vector with elements ui:i=1…6  such 
that u1=u2=u3=u4=u5=u6>0. 
PCA analysis was performed on the entire data-set of top-decile elite genomes; and 
the results are presented graphically and discussed further in [14]. Although p1 ac-
counts for more than 50% of the variance in all homologous sets, the highest value is 
90.29% for p1 of the βmin set, which is not high enough to cause alarm. The mean vari-
ance accounted for by p1 across all homologous sets was 68% (s.d.=10%), and the 
minimum value was 58%. Also, the angle θ is safely high in all cases (mean=24
o; 
s.d.=17
o; min=5
o; max=50
o). So, the evolved ZIP60s are not ZIP8s in disguise. 
 
3.4 Discussion: Fewer Hybrids? 
Comparing the ZIP8 and ZIP60 results presented here reveals that for ZIP60 the GA 
much less frequently discovers hybrid values of Qs yielding overall market dynamics 
that are better than those of the corresponding fixed-market CDA Qs=0.5 experiments. 
That is, despite the final ZIP60 EM evolved Qs values varying quite widely, few of 
them give results that are statistically significantly better than the corresponding FM 
results. Data tables available in [13] show that in two thirds (12 out of 18) of the 
original ZIP8 experiments, the EM experiment found a “hybrid” Qs value that im-
proved on the corresponding FM score; yet in the ZIP60 experiments, the occurrence 
of superior EM results fell by 67%, i.e. from 12/18 down to 4/18. This could be an  
indication that the previously-published results showing evolved hybrid auction 
mechanisms are to some extent artifacts of the lack of sophistication in the ZIP8 trad-
ers that were used in those studies. A counterargument to this is that Byde [2] pre-
sented results from applying similar GA-search for designs for hybrid sealed-bid auc-
tions, where the GA found hybrid solutions to be preferable to the traditional first-
price and second-price sealed bid auctions and those results were independent of the 
sophistication of the traders in the market. Clearly this is another issue that should be 
explored in more depth in future research.  
 
4. Conclusions 
From the data summarized and analyzed in this paper, it is clear that the ZIP60 variant 
of ZIP is a genuine improvement on the original ZIP8, and that ZIP60 parameter-
vectors that outperform ZIP8 by over 10% can be found by a search/optimization 
process such as the simple GA used here, provided that care is taken in the progres-
sive expansion of the dimensionality of the search-space explored by that GA. Princi-
pal component analysis of the elite evolved parameter-sets from multiple runs under 
differently-changing sequences of supply and demand schedules revealed that the 
evolved parameter-vectors make active use of considerably more values than the eight 
available in ZIP8. The fact that (in comparison to previous experiments using ZIP8 
traders) the experiments with ZIP60 traders reported here show a reduced incidence 
of the discovery of “hybrid” auction mechanisms is possibly an indication that the 
hybrid auctions reported on in the E-Commerce Research and Applications journal 
paper [12] actually evolved as a consequence of the lack of sophistication in the be-
havior of ZIP8 traders: with the comparatively finer-grained responses of ZIP60 trad-
ers, hybrid mechanisms evolve much less frequently, and so it is tempting to conjec-
ture that if the same type of auction-design experiments were repeated with even more 
sophisticated trader agents, hybrid mechanisms would not occur at all. Exploring that 
question remains one of several topics for further research.  
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